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I. INTRODUCTION
This Comment analyzes systemic risk in the financial system and
shows how current regulations provide insufficient protection for our
capital markets. Though the mortgage crisis and subsequent liquidity crisis currently affecting Wall Street provide the context for this
analysis, this Comment is neither meant as a full account of these
events, nor a detailed exploration of our banking regulations. Rather,
this Comment shows how the incentives created by our current regulatory regime lead to externalities that threaten the stability of the
financial system.1 By focusing on the incentives guiding financial actors, this Comment proposes a novel approach to financial regulation
using mechanisms that have effectively internalized external costs in
conceptually similar scenarios.
Current regulatory mechanisms aimed at producing financial stability, specifically the Basel II Capital Adequacy Framework, actually exaggerate crises by forcing firms to sell assets during liquidity
shocks, compounding their tendencies to panic. These command and
*. J.D. Candidate, May 2009, Florida State University College of Law; B.A., Florida State
University. Special thanks to Professor Dino Falaschetti, Alyssa Lathrop, and Trevor Thompson.
1. This Comment roughly documents events that occurred through the summer of
2008; while the crisis has evolved considerably since then, my analysis of the financial actors’ underlying incentives remains unchanged.
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control regulations fail because they attempt to legislate around the
problem instead of adequately addressing the inefficient incentives
that influence firms and their managers. However, as this Comment
discusses below, a market-based cap and trade system may resolve
many of these issues by directing firms toward more socially optimal
investment strategies.
This Comment begins with a short summary of systemic risk and
follows with an analysis of the subprime crisis in Part II. Part III
provides a brief background on economic regulation and shows how a
tradable permit system can efficiently reduce systemic risk. Part
IV concludes.
II. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO SYSTEMIC RISK
Systemic risk has been the subject of extensive economic commentary, but it has received little attention from legal scholars.2 In part,
this is due to the abstract nature of the problem. Systemic risk is
“not always defined and remains somewhat nebulous,” making analyses difficult.3 Further, definitions across the literature are not entirely consistent.4 However, systemic risk can be generally defined as
the risk that a negative shock to a firm or asset will result in losses
or failure across the financial system.5
This risk is a result of the divergence between private and socially
optimal investment strategies.6 Firms price only the internal costs
and benefits of any particular transaction and not risks to the financial system.7 This produces a classic externality: firms imposing costs
on third parties will not, without regulation, internalize the effects of
their actions. Concretely, it is more profitable to take on more risk
and leverage than is socially optimal.8

2. This Comment is one of the few to address the problem. The first was Professor
Steven Schwarcz’s Systemic Risk. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 247
(2008) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Systemic Risk] (noting that it is “the first major work of legal
scholarship on systemic risk”).
3. John Kambhu et al., Hedge Funds, Financial Intermediation, and Systemic Risk,
13 FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV. 1, 5 (2007).
4. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 196-97.
5. See id.; Kambhu et al., supra note 3, at 5-6.
6. This divergence is commonly referred to as a prisoner’s dilemma. The rational
choice for each agent leads to collectively unfavorable consequences.
7. See Systemic Risk: Examining Regulators’ Ability to Respond to Threats to the Financial System: Hearing Before the H. Fin. Servs. Comm., 110th Cong. 49 (2007) [hereinafter Systemic Risk Hearings] (statement of Richard Bookstaber), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:39
903.pdf (stating that firms do not price external risks); Kambhu et al., supra note 3, at 6
(observing that systemic risk is an externality); Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at
206 (“Thus, market participants will not want to internalize those costs and will take an
insufficient amount of care to prevent them.”).
8. See infra Part IV.B.4.
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III. ANALYZING THE CREDIT CRISIS
Though intuitively appealing, the crisis is not the result of widespread mortgage fraud or predatory lending, as generally believed.9
While current foreclosure rates are record setting, national data has
only been collected since 1979, and the previous record was set after
the 2001 recession, which was hardly the Great Depression.10 Though
attributed to failing subprime securities, the credit crunch was a result of misaligned incentives, which created externalities entirely unrelated to the housing market. Subprime defaults served only as a
trigger event for an endogenous response that amplified losses across
the market.
A. MBS Risk Modeling Understated Default Risk
The poor performance of subprime mortgages affected Wall Street
through mortgage backed securities (MBS), which were sold and held
by nearly all major financial institutions. MBS are created when
lenders pool mortgages into a legally distinct subsidiary special purpose vehicle (SPV).11 These loans are resold to a second SPV, often
owned by an investment bank, which finances the purchase of these
loans by selling bonds on the capital markets.12 The proceeds from
the sale are used to pay the first SPV for the loans, which are in turn
used to pay the lender.13 These bonds are divided into prioritized

9. There are a number of articles mistakenly criticizing the subprime mortgage
market as a market for lemons. See, e.g., Kurt Eggert, Held up in Due Course: Predatory
Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503
(2002); Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255 (2002); Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 2039 (2007) [hereinafter Engel & McCoy, Blind Eye]; Patricia A. McCoy,
A Behavioral Analysis of Predatory Lending, 38 AKRON L. REV. 725 (2005); John A.E. Pottow, Private Liability for Reckless Consumer Lending, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 405.
10. See U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INFORMATION ON RECENT DEFAULT AND
FORECLOSURE TRENDS FOR HOME MORTGAGES AND ASSOCIATED ECONOMIC AND MARKET
DEVELOPMENTS 14 (2008) [hereinafter RECENT DEFAULT AND FORECLOSURE TRENDS],
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0878r.pdf.
11. Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185,
2208-09 (2007); Thomas E. Plank, Sense and Sensibility in Securitization: A Prudent Legal
Structure and a Fanciful Critique, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 617, 621-22 (2008).
12. Peterson, supra note 11, at 2208-09; Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133, 135, 142 (1994) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Alchemy].
13. See generally Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Predatory Lending: What
Does Wall Street Have to Do with It?, 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 715 (2004); Peterson, supra note 11. For a more detailed look at securitization, see COMM. ON BANKR. & CORP.
REORGANIZATION, ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NY, STRUCTURED FINANCING
TECHNIQUES 6 (2005) (originally published in 50 BUS. LAW. 527 (1995)); STEVEN L.
SCHWARCZ ET AL., SECURITIZATION, STRUCTURED FINANCE AND CAPITAL MARKETS 6-7
(2004); Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1539 (2004);
Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 12.

248

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:245

tranches that allocate risk and returns among note holders.14 Because these offerings are so complex and the production of investment grade securities so critical,15 structured offerings are heavily influenced by ratings agencies’ analysis of the underlying collateral.16
Though investment grade securities bear little risk, they comprise
more than ninety percent of any particular deal. Conversely, subordinated tranches compose roughly ten percent of the average MBS
structure but bear almost all the risk.17 Because tranching prioritizes
payments, junior securities are leveraged against the mortgage pool,
creating significant tail risk for these investors.18 If losses exceed the
value of junior securities, they will be wiped out and the next junior
class will be impacted, up to the senior class. Thus, small miscalculations with regard to losses can have disparate effects in subordinate
tranches.19 The effect is that junior tranches “have the appearance of
producing very high alphas (high returns for low risk)” by ignoring

14. See sources cited supra note 13. Senior tranches receive first priority to payments
and are practically guaranteed. Subordinated tranches demand a higher rate of return and
are paid only if there are sufficient funds. COMM. ON THE GLOBAL FIN. SYS., BANK FOR INT’L
SETTLEMENTS, THE ROLE OF RATINGS IN STRUCTURED FINANCE: ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS
4 (2005) [hereinafter ROLE OF RATINGS IN STRUCTURED FINANCE], available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs23.pdf (“A key goal of the tranching process is to create at least
one class of securities whose rating is higher than the average rating of the underlying collateral pool or to create rated securities from a pool of unrated assets. This is accomplished
through the use of credit support (enhancement), such as prioritisation of payments to the
different tranches.”); Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 12, at 143 (“The interest rate on these
subordinated securities would be higher than the interest rate on the non-subordinated (or
senior) securities to compensate for the greater risk.”).
15. Most MBS may only be sold to qualified investors, and many of the primary purchasers of structured finance products have ratings-based constraints limiting their investment options. ROLE OF RATINGS IN STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 14; Engel &,
McCoy, Blind Eye, supra note 9, at 2047; see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2008) (defining
qualified investor).
16. See DEBASH CHATTERJEE ET AL., MOODY’S INVESTOR SERVICES, 2007 REVIEW AND
2008 OUTLOOK: HOME EQUITY ABS 2-3 (2008).
17. David Greenlaw et al., Leveraged Losses: Lessons from the Mortgage Market
Meltdown 17 (Feb. 29, 2008) (unpublished draft), available at http://www.chicagogsb.edu/
usmpf/docs/usmpf2008confdraft.pdf (indicating that, in typical subprime securitization, securities are 80% AAA, 9.6% AA, 5% A, 3.5% BBB, and only 1.1% lower rated).
18. ROLE OF RATINGS IN STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 14, at 4. See generally
Raghuram G. Rajan, Has Finance Made the World Riskier?, 12 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 499
(2006); Joseph R. Mason & Joshua Rosner, Where Did the Risk Go? How Misapplied Bond
Ratings Cause Mortgage Backed Securities and Collateralized Debt Obligation Market
Disruptions (May 14, 2007) (unpublished draft), available at http://www.ssrn.com/
abstract=1027475. Tail risk is the term for positions or investments “that offer[] high returns most of the time but entail[] a hidden risk, albeit a small risk, of extraordinary losses
or default.” Linda Chatman Thomsen et al., Hedge Funds: An Enforcement Perspective, 39
RUTGERS L.J. 541, 575 n.201 (2008). The analogy is often made to disaster insurance: insurers demand high premiums to cover hurricane-prone property. As long as a disaster
never occurs, these companies make considerable profit. However, in the rare event that a
disastrous storm occurs, the costs of covering the damage can be devastating. Cf. Rajan,
supra, at 516.
19. ROLE OF RATINGS IN STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 14, at 12.
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the risk of rare, devastating events.20 While an MBS bond will generally outperform comparably rated corporate bonds, in rare events the
loss volatility significantly exceeds the risk posed by comparable investments, exposing investors to significant losses.21
As the housing market slowed, lenders attempted to maintain
market share by originating higher loan-to-value ratio mortgages, often with adjustable rates.22 Many of these loans did not fully document the borrowers’ income or assets. Though these loans carried increased risk of default, they are not the cause of the subprime crisis:
as the terms of loans became riskier, lenders compensated by lending
to increasingly creditworthy borrowers.23 Lenders increased default
only by creating a class of homeowners who were particularly sensitive to declining house price appreciation.24
1. Mortgage
Assumptions

Backed

Securities

Relied

on

Faulty

Loan

Subprime MBS tranches are structured according to ratings
models, which evaluate the expected default rate of the mortgage
pool.25 Though obvious now, the models were produced from fundamentally incomplete data. Because subprime lending was cyclically
untested, these models could not quantify the effects of depreciation
on subprime borrowers.26
Default can take two forms.27 The first, ruthless default, is determined by a borrower’s rational choice.28 Rational borrowers de20. Rajan, supra note 18, at 516.
21. ROLE OF RATINGS IN STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 14, at 11-12 (“As a result,
given that ratings are based on expected loss or probability of default, structured finance
tranches can be significantly riskier than investments in bond portfolios with identical
(weighted average) ratings.”).
22. CHATTERJEE ET AL., supra note 16, at 2.
23. KEVIN KENDRA & GLENN COSTELLO, SUBPRIME MORTGAGE DISTRESS EFFECT ON
CDOS 25 (2007), available at http://www.fitchratings.com/web_content/sectors/subprime/
CDO_Exposure_to_Subprime_Mortgage_Markets_Web_Cast_w_RMBS_Slides.ppt.
24. See Krisopher Gerardi et al., Subprime Outcomes: Risky Mortgages, Homeownership and Foreclosure 3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, Working Paper No. 15, 2007),
http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/wp/wp2007/wp0715.pdf.
25. See COMM. ON THE GLOBAL FIN. SYS., supra note 14, at 16-20; Mason & Rosner,
supra note 18, at 8.
26. David Greenlaw et al., supra note 17, at 14 n.8 (citing FITCH RATINGS,
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE SPECIAL REPORT: DRIVERS OF 2006 SUBPRIME VINTAGE
PERFORMANCE (2007)).
27. Gerardi et al., supra note 24, at 8-9. Note that these two concepts are not strictly opposite; rational borrowers are unlikely to default if they are not also experiencing some cash flow
problems. Id. at 3-4, 8-9 (noting that neither concept is completely theoretically satisfying).
28. Michelle A. Danis & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Delinquency of Subprime
Mortgages, 60 J. ECON. & BUS. 67, 71 (2008) (“[T]he main feature of a ruthless default is
that it makes financial sense because the mortgage is substantially larger than the value
of the property.”). This is also referred to as the option model of default. Gerardi et al., supra note 24, at 8.
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fault only if they have negative equity, as refinancing or selling is
preferable to foreclosure.29 Once the outstanding balance of the loan
exceeds the home’s value, it may be rational to default if opportunity
cost of maintaining the loan exceeds the value of maintaining the
loan.30 The second, distressed default, occurs when a borrower, despite his or her best efforts, cannot maintain payments.31
It appears that “low subsequent house price appreciation” is the
primary factor influencing the increased delinquency of 2006 and
2007 vintage subprime loans.32 Because models predict defaults from
the loss history of similar loans,33 ratings do not immediately reflect
changes in underwriting standards.34 When the market began to fall,
borrowers’ incentives fundamentally changed in a way that subprime
borrowing had never experienced. This paradigm shift was simply
29. Danis & Pennington-Cross, supra note 28, at 68 (“A mortgage is put . . . when the
mortgage outstanding is greater than the value of the property after accounting for costs
such as transaction fees.”); Gerardi, supra note 24, at 10 (“[N]egative equity is a necessary
condition for default.”).
30. For example, a borrower expecting to live in a home for many years may not be influenced at all, while investors would have greater incentives to default. See Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law & Economics of Subprime Lending, 80 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1, 44 (2008) (“[U]nless a given homeowner intends to sell her home, short-term
changes in property values are fundamentally irrelevant to these borrowers.”); id. at 33
(“[Evidence] suggests that an increasing number of subprime loans in recent years may
have been issued to investors and speculators, not to families. Because these properties
were bought for the purpose of speculation, their owners might be especially likely to exercise the default option in response to declining residential real estate prices.”).
31. Id. at 26, 50-51; see also Danis & Pennington-Cross, supra note 28, at 68 (noting
that nonfinancial motivations, such as “losing a job, a severe illness, or the breakup of a
household,” can also lead to default).
32. Yuliya Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the Subprime Mortgage
Crisis 2, 32-33 (Dec. 5, 2008) (unpublished draft), available at http://www.ssrn.com/
abstract=1020396; see also GLENN COSTELLO, FITCH RATINGS, UPDATE ON U.S. RMBS:
PERFORMANCE, EXPECTATIONS, CRITERIA 11 (2008) (indicating that, of the loans that originated in 2006, twenty-three percent of borrowers with 636 FICO scores, second liens, and
negative appreciation are delinquent, while approximately fifteen percent of borrowers
with 607 FICO scores, negative appreciation but no second lien are delinquent); KENDRA &
COSTELLO, supra note 23, at 25 (indicating that defaulted loans have a ten percent higher
loan-to-value ratios than performing loans); RECENT DEFAULT AND FORECLOSURE TRENDS,
supra note 10, at 33 (showing graph indicating close positive relationship between foreclosure rates and areas with sharpest drop off of home price appreciation).
33. Greenlaw et al., supra note 17, at 13-14 (explaining that the common model for estimating default “simply extrapolates the performance – defaults, loss severities, and total
loss rates – of each ‘vintage’ (origination year) of subprime and other mortgage loans,
based on its own history as well as the typical progression pattern through time”).
34. See Mason & Rosner, supra note 18, at 38 (noting that “changes to origination
standards may be manifested in adverse loan performance only after a substantial lag”);
see also Zywicki & Adamson, supra note 30, at 50 (noting that default models were developed during a period of continuous appreciation and “may not be equally valid when applied to subprime borrowers or in a declining real estate market”); Greenlaw et al., supra
note 17, at 14 (“[B]ecause the detailed mortgage performance data required to build these
types of models are available only back to the mid-1990s, there are no observations on how
defaults and losses on a particular vintage change through time when home prices start
to fall.”).
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not captured by ratings models. Adjustable rate loans, though demonized, were not the cause of the fallout; the “overwhelming majority”
of subprime loans entered foreclosure prior to the interest
rate resetting.35
The occurrence of these defaults was surprising only because of
the limited history of subprime borrowing. Default models have been
developed over a period of largely uninterrupted appreciation in
housing prices.36 Prior to 2006, subprime borrowers could easily refinance or sell instead of foreclosing, which produced unrealistic assumptions about subprime borrowing. However, after the market
fell, many otherwise creditworthy borrowers had an incentive to default. This paradigm shift in borrower incentives would have been
impossible to predict from historic performance data.
2. MBS Have Been Downgraded—Not Wiped Out
Because ratings models did not anticipate the regime shift in subprime performance, issuers undercollateralized subprime securities.
When defaults exceeded expectations, cash flows were compromised,
and mortgage pools could not meet their obligations to investors.
However, the extent to which the actual worth of these securities was
impacted still is not clear. The market value of subprime MBS has
fallen because, once these assets depart from ratings agency predictions, it is nearly impossible to determine how to price them.
After the performance of subprime mortgage securities began to
suffer, Moody’s, a large ratings agency, revised its credit risk model
and reviewed outstanding securities, resulting in significant downgrades.37 However, these ratings revisions are primarily confined to
securities issued after housing prices began to decline.38 Practically

35. Zywicki & Adamson, supra note 30, at 28. Hybrid adjustable rate mortgages have
been blamed for much of the current mortgage crisis. See, e.g., Sheila C. Bair, Op-Ed., Fix
Rates to Save Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2007, at A25, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/19/opinion/19bair.html?_r=1&oref=slogin. These loans
have artificially low interest rates for two to three years, which reset to a higher adjustable
rate. RECENT DEFAULT AND FORECLOSURE TRENDS, supra note 10, at 16, 40; see also Demyanyk & Van Hemert, supra note 32, at 6. However, the worst performing loans were
originated in 2006 and 2007. Id. at 2 (“The subprime mortgage crisis of 2007 was characterized by an unusually large fraction of subprime mortgages originated in 2006 and 2007
becoming delinquent or in foreclosure only months later.”). These loans began to reset only
recently and mathematically could not have been the cause of the subprime crisis; interest rates
on the 2006 vintage only began resetting in 2008, well after the mortgage market collapsed.
36. See Gerardi et al., supra note 24, at 35 (noting “the favorable economic environment that has largely characterized the existence of the subprime mortgage market from
its emergence in 1993 up until the past few years”); Mason & Rosner, supra note 18, at 3.
37. PETER MCNALLY, MOODY’S INVESTOR SERVICES, U.S. SUBPRIME RMBS 2005-2007
VINTAGE RATING ACTIONS UPDATE: JANUARY 2008, at 1 (2008).
38. See Mason & Rosner, supra note 18, at 6-7; see also Demyanyk & Van Hemert, supra note 32, at 2 (noting that subprime crisis disproportionately affected 2006-07 mortgages).
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none of the 2005 vintage first-lien securities have been impacted.39
For the 2006 vintage, however, downgrades have been more pronounced. Nearly half of 2006 first-lien securities, including over ninety percent of all assets below its highest rating of AAA, have been
downgraded.40 Downgrades for 2007 securities have not been as severe, with thirty-seven percent of first-lien and fifty-five percent of
second-lien tranches being downgraded.41
Though downgrades are easily cataloged, actual losses are currently impossible to determine.42 Though both 2005 and 2006 each
have delinquencies exceeding thirty percent of the outstanding balance, cumulative losses are still below two percent.43 While delinquent mortgages are not meeting monthly obligations, we cannot determine how the final worth of these securities will be affected. For
instance, if all delinquent properties foreclose, losses will be catastrophic. Conversely, losses will be mitigated if lenders modify the
loans or if borrowers are able to refinance or become current. The
problem is not that tranches have been wiped out, but that there is
no way to determine how far they have diverged from model price.44
This uncertainty is a primary cause of the current crisis. As MBS
performance declined, investors had an incentive to move these assets off of their balance sheets before losses increased.45 However, collective selling depressed both price and liquidity. Under the mark-tomarket rule, firms had to revalue their balance sheets to reflect this
new market price.46 This created a negative feedback loop such that
39. MCNALLY, supra note 37, at 2 (2008) (indicating that less than six percent of 2005
first-lien notes were downgraded). Second-lien securities have fared worse, id., but the underlying collateral was much riskier and these securities were only a minimal part of the
market. See id. at 5-8 (showing that second-lien securities accounted for less than ten percent of rated transactions in any given year).
40. Id. at 2-3. Similarly, over ninety percent of all second-lien securities have been
downgraded. Id.
41. Id.
42. See David Reilly, Wave of Write-Offs Rattles Market; Accounting Rules Blasted as
Dow Falls; A $600 Billion Toll?, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 1, 2008, at A1.
43. ANDREW J. GIUDICI & ERNESTINE WARNER, STANDARD & POOR’S, U.S. SUBPRIME
RMBS PERFORMANCE UPDATE: JANUARY 2008 DISTRIBUTION DATE (2008),
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/us/page.article/4,5,5,1,1204262834087.html.
44. See, e.g., Bomi Lim, Merrill May Fail to Sell Bad Loans to Korea Asset,
BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 4, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=
a0QemFmcMrdA&dbk (describing Merril Lynch’s difficulty selling troubled loans because
of difficulties in pricing the assets).
45. See Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 214 (“Panics can trigger market
failures . . . when doubt arising over a market’s future liquidity triggers a stampede to sell
first while the market is still liquid . . . .”).
46. See 26 U.S.C. § 475(a)(1) (2000) (“Any security which is inventory in the hands of
the dealer shall be included in inventory at its fair market value.”); FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS
BD., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARD 133-3 (2008), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/
aop_FAS133.pdf (requiring all entities to account for derivatives and hedges at a “fair value”); see also 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-01(a)(1) (2008) (requiring financial statements to be prepared according to U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles); The Roles of the SEC
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the decision to sell by one firm imposes a negative price effect on the
balance sheets of all other firms, creating an incentive to be the first
to sell.47 The result was a panic that made subprime MBS virtually
illiquid, destroying what little market existed.48 Once the market
dried up, banks were “left oxymoronically trying to estimate what
market prices would be if markets existed.”49 This is a liquidity crisis;
the market price is “disconnected” from the actual value of these securities.50 Indeed, many investors are adamant that these securities
are worth significantly more than what they are currently valued in
the market.51
B. A Systemic Crisis
As the market for subprime mortgage securities fell apart, the
firms’ reactions became disconnected from the housing market and
the value of any particular asset. Collective purchasing and selling
strategies created a tragedy of the commons, where competitive incentives led to perverse, inefficient results. The systemic risk is not
that subprime securities are correlated to the housing market, but
that firms priced only the internal costs and benefits of their investment strategies and not the risk imposed on the financial system.52

and the FASB in Establishing GAAP: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Capital Mkts.,
Ins., & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 107th Cong. 2 (2002), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/051402rh.pdf (testimony of Robert K.
Herdman, Chief Accountant, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n) (noting that the SEC considers
FASB statements definitive for determining GAAP).
The mark-to-market rule requires “companies to value many of the securities they
hold at whatever price prevails in the market, no matter how sharply those prices swing.”
Reilly, supra note 42. See generally Daniel Gross, The Mark-to-Market Melee: Is an Obscure
Accounting Rule to Blame for the Credit Market Meltdown?, SLATE, Apr. 1, 2008,
http://www.slate.com/id/2187880.
47. See Guillaume Plantin et al., Marking-to-Market: Panacea or Pandora’s Box?, 46
J. ACCT. RES. 435, 439 (2008) [hereinafter Plantin et al., Panacea or Pandora’s Box?];
Reilly, supra note 42.
48. See Plantin et al., Panacea or Pandora’s Box?, supra note 47, at 439 (“Anticipating
this negative outcome, a short-horizon firm is tempted to preempt the fall in price by selling the asset itself. However, such preemptive action merely serves to amplify the price
fall.”); Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 214-15.
49. Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Mark to Meltdown?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2008, at A16,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120468045939012133.html.
50. See Reilly, supra note 42 (“ ‘Many people would take the view that price and ultimately [sic] value have disconnected.’ ” (quoting Neal Soss, Chief Economist, Credit Suisse)).
51. Jenkins, supra note 49 (predicting write-ups will “undo much of the damage once
the ‘panic’ subsides”); Reilly, supra note 42.
52. See Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 206. See generally PRESIDENT’S
WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONGTERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (1999).
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This creates an externality imposed by the unpriced costs of exploiting the financial system—a public good.53
Subprime MBS are an attractive investment as lower rated
tranches generally outperform similarly rated securities with the
same average expected loss54 and have the “appearance of producing
very high . . . returns for low risk.”55 However, rare losses to these assets can be substantial. For fund managers,56 who are compensated
and compete based on returns, the incentive is to “load up” on these
assets to outperform rival firms.57 However, competitors are forced to
take similar risks, pushing firms toward increasingly inferior investment strategies.58 This incentive reinforces suboptimal investment strategies in two ways. First, in the short term, firms that take
excessive risk will outperform more conservative rivals; in order to
maintain market share, these other firms must then increase leverage and exposure to illiquid markets to remain competitive.59
Second, because the entire market is engaged in similar strategies, a
large loss will affect everyone, reducing accountability for poor performance.60 These firms are “well aware of the consequences of their
moves into less liquid markets, as are their counterparties.”61 The
problem is not a lack of disclosure or asymmetric information, but of
individual incentives that must be aligned with the efficient
collective outcome.62
The same maximizing incentives to take risky positions also create
incentives to be the first to sell if there is fear of an impending liquidity problem.63 This rush to sell creates a fire sale, “inadvertently

53. See Frank Partnoy, Why Markets Crash and What Law Can Do About It, 61 U.
PITT. L. REV. 741 (2000) (describing market stability as a public good); Schwarcz, Systemic
Risk, supra note 2, at 207-08 (“[P]reservation of the financial system is socially desirable.”).
54. ROLE OF RATINGS IN STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 14, at 11-12.
55. Rajan, supra note 18, at 516.
56. Though hedge funds have been demonized, the incentives involved are common to
most financial actors. See generally Rajan, supra note 18.
57. Id. at 516-17; see also Kambhu et al., supra note 3, at 9 (indicating that a hedge
fund’s “opacity and incentive structure may increase the likelihood of such an event as
managers turn toward high-risk strategies with substantial tail-risk”).
58. See Kambhu et al., supra note 3, at 13 (discussing concern that competition may
create “pressures that weaken credit risk mitigation practices”); cf. James Brown et al.,
Auditor Independence and Earnings Quality: Evidence for Market Discipline vs. SarbanesOxley Proscriptions 14-15 (Fla. State Univ. College of Law, Pub. Law Research Paper No.
259, 2008) (discussing governance spillovers in auditor independence context).
59. Kambhu et al., supra note 3, at 13 (stating competition may result in “inadequate
risk controls such as lower initial margin levels, collateralization practices, or exposure
limits”); Rajan, supra note 18, at 517 (discussing incentive to herd on risky investments).
60. Rajan, supra note 18, at 517.
61. Kambhu et al., supra note 3, at 8 box 2.
62. Brown et al., supra note 58, at 15 (“Indeed, even if markets enjoy complete information about a firm’s governance decisions, they will only price the internal costs and benefits of those decisions.”).
63. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 214.
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destroying the market’s liquidity.”64 This effect is produced because
firms’ balance sheets are linked: one firm’s decision to sell depresses
the value of all like assets.65 If a firm’s balance sheet is sufficiently affected, a liquidity crisis can turn into a solvency crisis. The rational
strategy is then to preemptively sell as soon as performance declines,
avoiding mark-to-market losses. Collectively, every firm feels this incentive, amplifying the price fall.66 Stated differently, herding on the
upside of the market leads participants to herd on the downside as
well, creating a system where actors buy high and sell low.67
Problematically, the very regulations that were supposed to reduce system risk contributed to the crisis. The Basel Capital Accords
are international banking regulations promulgated by the Bank for
International Settlements.68 The Basel Accords calculate minimum
amounts that capital banks must maintain to prevent institutional
failure and ensure financial stability. The United States is currently
implementing Basel II69 while phasing out its previous incarnation,
64. Id. at 214-15.
65. Plantin et al., Panacea or Pandora’s Box?, supra note 47, at 439 (“A bad outcome
for the asset depresses fundamental values somewhat, but the more pernicious effect
comes from the negative externalities generated by other firms selling. When others sell,
observed transaction prices are depressed more than is justified by the fundamentals, and
exert a negative effect on all others, but especially on those who have chosen to hold on to
the asset.”).
66. Id. at 439-40.
67. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 216-17. While Professor Schwarcz calls
this behavior irrational, it is only collectively irrational; individually, such behavior is
maximizing, producing a prisoner’s dilemma. Id.; see also Rajan, supra note 18, at 516-18
(describing perverse incentives for fund managers); Hyun Song Shin, Risk and Liquidity in
a System Context 4 (BIS Working Papers No. 212, 2006) [hereinafter Shin, Risk and Liquidity], available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=898411.
68. “The [Bank for International Settlements] is an international organisation which
fosters cooperation among central banks and other agencies in pursuit of monetary and financial stability. Its banking services are provided exclusively to central banks and international organisations.” Bank for International Settlements, http://www.bis.org (last visited Apr. 11, 2009).
69. See Risk-Based Capital Standards: Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework —
Basel II, 72 Fed. Reg. 69,288, 69,288 (Dec. 7, 2007) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, 12 C.F.R. pt.
208, 225, 12 C.F.R. pt. 325, 12 C.F.R. pt. 559, 560, 563, 567); BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (2006), available at http://www.bis.org/
publ/bcbs128.pdf; Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Board Approves Final Rules to Implement Basel II Risk-Based Capital Framework (Nov. 2, 2007)
[hereinafter Implementing Basel], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
press/bcreg/20071102a.htm.
The Federal Reserve, SEC, FDIC, Office of the Comptroller of Currency, and Office
of Thrift Supervision all share regulatory and oversight responsibilities for Basel in the
United States. These agencies have implemented the Accord on varying timelines. For instance, the SEC allows investment banks, defined as broker-dealers, to voluntarily use Basel II to compute net capital requirements. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
Similarly, the Federal Reserve and Treasury have adopted a Final Rule requiring
commercial banks and other institutions to adopt Basel II. This rule, however, has not
been fully implemented. Since April 1, 2008, these institutions have been able to begin a
mandatory parallel run of the Basel II capitalization requirements. Under the parallel run,
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Basel I.70 The primary difference between Basel I and II is the complexity of the calculations used to determine adequate capitalization.
For instance, Basel I assesses the same capitalization requirements
against all unsecured corporate bonds and residential mortgages, regardless of actual risk. Basel II calculates capital requirements on
both the type of holding and the particular risks associated with that
holding.71 For purposes of this Comment, Basel I and II create the
same perverse incentives; Basel II merely provides a more nuanced
calculation of net capital.
While commercial banks are still required to calculate minimum
capital requirements under Basel I, the institutions most affected by
the credit crisis have already moved to Basel II.72 The Securities and
Exchange Commission allows investment banks to adopt Basel II’s
capitalization requirements under the Consolidated Supervised Entity program.73 All of the largest investment banks, including Bear

each institution required to adopt Basel II must calculate net capital under both Basel I
and II for one year prior to switching completely to Basel II requirements. See Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Comptroller Dugan Tells International
Bankers that Basel II U.S. Implementation on a Prudent, Deliberate Path (Mar. 3, 2008),
available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2008-26.htm; see also U.S. DEP’T OF
TREASURY & FED. RESERVE SYS., INTERAGENCY STATEMENT — U.S. IMPLEMENTATION OF
BASEL II ADVANCED APPROACHES FRAMEWORK: QUALIFICATION PROCESS 4 (2008), available
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2008/SR0804a1.pdf (describing parallel run and implementation process).
70. 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A (2008); 12 C.F.R. pt. 208, app. A (2008); 12 C.F.R. pt. 225
app. A (2008); 12 C.F.R. pt. 325 app. A (2008); 12 C.F.R. pt. 567 subpt. B (2008). See generally BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (1998), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbsc111.pdf?noframes=1.
71. See Randall S. Kroszner, Member of the Bd. of Governors, U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Remarks at the New York Banker Association Annual Washington Visit, Basel II Implementation in the United States (July 12, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/speech/kroszner20070712a.htm.
72. Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers that Are Part of Consolidated Supervised Entities, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,428, 34,428 (June 21, 2004) (codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 200, 240) [hereinafter Alternative Net Capital Requirements], available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-49830.pdf (establishing Basel II as alternative for investment banks). As a note to the reader, the CSE program was eliminated in September
2008 when all of the entities regulated under the program either collapsed or opted to be
treated as Bank Holding Companies, which are regulated by the Federal Reserve. See
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated
Supervised Entities Program (Sept. 26, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/
2008-230.htm; see also Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Concedes Oversight Flaws Fueled Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/27/
business/27sec.html.
73. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a)(7) (2008) (permitting broker-dealers to adopt Basel II
guidelines for establishing minimum capital); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1e (requiring that broker-dealers use alternate net capital requirements); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1g (providing
conditions for broker-dealers to use the alternative Basel net capital requirements); see also Alternative Net Capital Requirements, supra note 72 (adopting final rule that includes
the SEC’s description of the alternative net capital program).
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Stearns, Goldman Sachs, and J.P. Morgan, opted to use Basel II instead of the default rules for determining net capital requirements.74
Both Basel Accords were designed to ensure financial stability by
requiring banks and other financial institutions to maintain minimum capital requirements, mandating supervisory review of capital
adequacy, and requiring disclosures to ensure market discipline.75
Under Basel II, the capital cushion a bank must maintain is determined by its actual risk exposure.76 However, capital constraints are
determined against mark-to-market balance sheets,77 forcing firms to
write down the value of their holdings as the market price for subprime MBS fell. This reduced their total capital, forcing them to sell
assets to maintain Basel capital requirements.78 This forced liquidation further depressed market prices, requiring additional sales.79
Once subprime MBS became sufficiently illiquid, firms were forced to
sell otherwise unrelated assets in order to stay sufficiently capitalized, leading to problems in otherwise unrelated assets.80 For in74. Regulation of Investment Banks: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., &
Inv. of the S. Comm. on Bank., Hous. & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of
Erik Sirri, Dir., Div. of Trading and Mkts., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n).
75. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 69, at 2-3 (describing Basel’s
three pillar structure); Implementing Basel, supra note 69; see also Conrad Bahlke & Robert Lewin, US Regulators Respond to Basel II, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Dec. 2003, at 42, 43.
76. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 224; Kroszner, supra note 71; see also
17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15c3-1e, 240.15c3-1g. However, regardless of exposure, the broker-dealer
must maintain tentative net capital of at least $1 billion and actual net capital of $500 million. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a)(7)(i).
As an example of the detail required to compute net capital under Basel II, a firm’s
Value at Risk model (a method of measuring risk for particular holdings) must incorporate:
(A) Risks arising from the non-linear price characteristics of derivatives and
the sensitivity of the market value of those positions to changes in the volatility
of the derivatives’ underlying rates and prices;
(B) Empirical correlations with and across risk factors or, alternatively, risk
factors sufficient to cover all the market risk inherent in the positions in the
proprietary or other trading accounts of the broker or dealer, including interest
rate risk, equity price risk, foreign exchange risk, and commodity price risk;
(C) Spread risk, where applicable, and segments of the yield curve sufficient to
capture differences in volatility and imperfect correlation of rates along the
yield curve for securities and derivatives that are sensitive to different interest
rates; and
(D) Specific risk for individual positions.
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1e(d)(2)(iv).
77. See 26 U.S.C. § 475(a)(1) (2000); FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARD 133-3 (2008).
78. See Harald Benink et al., On the Role of Regulatory Banking Capital, 17 FIN. MKTS.,
INSTS. & INSTRUMENTS 85, 86 (2008) (discussing Basel II’s perverse result that banks must
sell falling assets to maintain capital requirements); see also Guillaume Plantin et al., Marking to Market, Liquidity, and Financial Stability, 23 MONETARY & ECON. STUDIES 133, 149
(2005) [hereinafter Plantin et al., Liquidity, and Financial Stability] (describing how marking
to market will require asset sales to satisfy minimum capital requirements).
79. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 213-14.
80. See Systemic Risk Hearings, supra note 7, at 48 (statement of Richard Bookstaber); George G. Kaufman, Banking and Currency Crises and Systemic Risk: Lessons from

258

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:245

stance, municipal bonds and auction-rate securities, traditionally
cash equivalents, have both suffered liquidity problems unrelated to
their fundamentals.81
While Basel II appears to reduce risk ex ante, it actually increases
market instability during a crisis by requiring firms to maintain minimum collateral against market prices.82 The result is a negative
price shock, which can create an endogenous feedback loop that
creates linked cycles of write-downs and forced sales. While the Basel
II framework has been criticized for its complexity and unintelligibility,83 Basel is inadequate not because of its opacity, but because of its
failure to address the underlying externality. Basel attempts to micromanage balance sheets but fails to force firms to internalize the
costs of their trading strategies.
Though highly leveraged private equity firms, such as hedge
funds, were forced to sell unrelated assets to meet margin or collateral calls when MBS collateral prices declined,84 this effect was less
important than the distress of critical intermediaries, such as investment banks or securities brokers. Hedge funds are private investment vehicles created to avoid the regulations facing other financial entities.85 If investors understand the risks, there is nothing particularly problematic about high-risk strategies. Further, “[e]mpirical
research supports focusing on the risk exposure of hedge fund counterparties.”86 Because hedge funds are not publicly traded and generally not large enough to impact the larger economy, they were likely
not a contributing factor to the systemic event we are now facing. Indeed, the failure of three Bear Stearns hedge funds in August 2007
did not cause an immediate disruption; the troubled investment bank
did not collapse until nearly nine months later.87
Recent Events, ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Third Q. 2000, at 9, 15, available at
http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/economicperspectives/2000/3qep2.pdf.
81. See Dominic Elliot & Tom Fairless, Hardest-to-Value Assets Escalate, WALL ST. J.
ONLINE, Apr. 15, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120820511277913811.html; Michael
A. Pollock, Munis Likely to Face Weakness, Volatility; Supply, Demand Thrown Off-Kilter
by Credit Turmoil, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2008, at C5.
82. See Rodrigo Cifuentes et al., Liquidity Risk and Contagion 32 (Bank of Eng.,
Working Paper No. 264, 2005), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=824166.
83. See Nicholas Budd, What Basel II Means for Specialized Lending, 22 INT’L FIN. L.
REV. 23, 23 (2003); Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 224.
84. See Kambhu et al., supra note 3, at 8 box 2.
85. Thomsen et al., supra note 18, at 543-44 (“[T]he term ‘hedge fund’ refers less to
the hedging techniques that such funds have originally employed than it does to their
present status as private and unregistered investment pools—so-called ‘alternative’ or
‘non-traditional’ investments.”).
86. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 223.
87. See Timeline of a Crisis, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Mar. 17, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB120576387418941803.html (indicating that Bear Stearns liquidated three hedge
funds on August 1, 2007, but did not fail until March 14, 2008). Similarly, the failure of
Carlyle Capital Fund did not significantly affect the market. See infra text accompanying
notes 98-100.
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These market liquidity crises result in firm-specific liquidity problems. Institutional investors rely on “short-term financing through
borrowing on a secured basis” to fund illiquid positions.88 However,
counterparties will either require additional collateral or simply
refuse to lend against troubled assets in fear that they will be “stuck
with assets that are dropping in market value in the event that borrowers can’t repay them.”89 As market liquidity further decreases,
firms become unwilling to lend on any terms out of fear for their
own liquidity.90
Without access to capital funding, margin calls force firms to sell
“assets into a falling market,”91 which further decreases prices, “setting off a nasty spiral in which assets are unloaded into a declining
market, placing even more downward pressure on values and leading
more lenders to call in loans.”92 Fear of default leads to a functionally
identical result in market liquidity: investors rush to close out positions, forcing the firm to default or liquidate its entire portfolio.93
Given the complex interdependent counterparty relationships in capital markets, liquidating a major institution could lead to defaults in
affected institutions or to additional panics.94
The collapse of Bear Stearns shows the effects of liquidity concerns. Lenders refused to extend credit during a “crisis of confidence,” and Bear Stearns could not fund its positions or post additional collateral.95 Its counterparties declared default and moved to
88. Press Release, Letter from Christopher Cox, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to
Dr. Nout Wellink, Chairman, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Sound Practices for
Managing Liquidity in Banking Organizations (Mar. 20, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-48.htm.
89. Serena Ng & Randall Smith, Another Source of Quick Cash Dries up: Firms Rethink Reliance on ‘Repo’ Financing as Conditions Tighten, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2008, at
C1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120571167285740199.html.
90. Kaufman, supra note 80, at 15; Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 214-15.
91. See Kambhu et al., supra note 3, at 8 box 2.
92. Peter A. McKay, Mounting Liquidation Fears Squeeze U.S. Stock Market, WALL
ST. J. ONLINE,
Mar.
6,
2008,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB120480186203616481.html.
93. See Viral V. Acharya & Stephen Schaefer, Liquidity Risk and Correlation Risk:
Implications for Risk Management 9-13 (Sept. 8, 2006) (unpublished draft), available at
http://www.greta.it/credit/credit2006/talk/Tuesday_26/1_Acharya.pdf; see also Schwarcz,
Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 213-14.
94. Kaufman, supra note 80, at 14-15 (describing how systemic events may be transmitted via counterparty relationships); Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 213-15
(describing how chain of failures could occur).
95. Cox, supra note 88. The SEC has raised concerns that several firms short sold
Bear Stearns stock and subsequently spread rumors about the firm’s solvency. In response,
the SEC issued an emergency rule, which prohibited “ ‘naked’ short selling” of certain financial institutions, including Goldman Sachs and Lehman Brothers. Emergency Order
Pursuant to Section 12(k)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market Developments, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 58166, 73
Fed. Reg. 42,379 (July 15, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/
34-58166.pdf; Securities Exchange Act Release No. 58190, 73 Fed. Reg. 42,837 (July 18,
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seize collateral. However, “the firm had a capital cushion well above
what is required to meet supervisory standards calculated using the
Basel II standard.”96 Bear Stearns was not insolvent; rather, counterparties rushed to close out positions in fear of impending insolvency.97 Similarly, the Carlyle Capital Group collapsed not from insolvency, but from panicked counterparties.98 Carlyle Capital was a
highly leveraged hedge fund consisting exclusively of AAA GSE securities.99 These securities are traditionally very safe and considered
guaranteed by the government; liquidity concerns, however, depressed their market price. As Carlyle’s asset values declined, lenders requested more collateral. Due to its leveraged position, Carlyle
could not obtain funding and failed to meet margin calls. Its lenders
seized their collateral and began auctioning its assets; the firm announced it would liquidate.100
Importantly, each firm’s behavior was individually rational. It
was in a firm’s best interest to sell its subprime exposures at the top
of the market. Similarly, Bear Stearns’ counterparties had clear incentives to be the first to close out their positions. The systemic problem is that firms have only the incentive to maximize their own welfare and, hence, price only the internal costs and benefits of any
risk.101 However, this problem is not novel; it is an archetypical tragedy of the commons. The proper regulatory mechanism is simply one
which forces firms to internalize the costs they impose on the market.
2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/34-58190.pdf (amending order); see
also Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Enhances Investor Protections Against
Naked Short Selling (July 15, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/
2008-143.htm. The order expired on August 12, 2008. See Order Extending Emergency Order Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market Developments, Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 58248, 73 Fed. Reg. 45,257 (July 29, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/34-58248.pdf (extending effective date of emergency
order). The S.E.C. later adopted a limited short-selling proscription that extends securities
fraud liability to persons who deceive a purchaser about their ability or intention to deliver
the security and then actually fail to deliver the security at settlement. ‘‘Naked’’ Short Selling Antifraud Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 61,666 (Oct. 17, 2008) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
96. Cox, supra note 88.
97. Id. (“The market rumors about Bear Stearns [sic] liquidity problems became
self-fulfilling.”).
98. See Carlyle’s Comeuppance: Debt Fund CCC Placed Bet on AAA Mortgage Bonds
and a Load of Leverage, WALL ST. J, Mar. 7, 2008, at C12, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120486025559518793.html; Peter Lattman, Carlyle Capital
to Liquidate What Is Left, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2008, at A12 [hereinafter Lattman, Liquidate], available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120572975692141167.html; Peter Lattman, Credit Crunch: Carlyle Capital Nears Collapse as Accord Can’t Be Reached, WALL ST.
J.,
Mar.
13,
2008,
at
C2,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB120537974320632835.html.
99. See Peter Lattman & Randall Smith, Carlyle Capital Aims to Halt a Meltdown;
Leveraged Vehicle Seeks ‘Stretchout’ on Loans; In a ‘Purgatory Age’, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8,
2008, at B1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120487123309819271.html.
100. Lattman, Liquidate, supra note 98.
101. Rajan, supra note 18, at 514-18, 523-24; Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at
206; Brown et al., supra note 58, at 14-15.
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IV. WHAT’S THE PROBLEM?
A. The Economics of Regulation
A legal regulatory regime presupposes a market failure. Absent
transaction costs, default legal rules would be irrelevant; rational individuals would bargain to produce efficient outcomes.102 However,
once market frictions are introduced, parties will bargain only if the
bargaining produces value that exceeds the cost of transacting.103
Regulation can improve the market outcome only if transaction costs
are limiting otherwise mutually beneficial trades.104 However, regulation is not costless, and the decision to impose liability or proscribe
conduct will also impose costs elsewhere in the market.105 Regulators
must decide “whether the gain from preventing the harm is greater
than the loss which would be suffered elsewhere as a result of stopping the action which produces the harm.”106 Efficient regulations
will assign liability (or proscribe conduct) to the party able to mitigate the harm at the least cost. Because we assume economic actors
are rational,107 individuals will price regulatory costs resulting in optimal abatement and social efficiency.
Sound regulatory policy attempts to minimize fraud and force
firms to internalize external costs.108 Market failures (or imperfections) include monopoly, underproduction of public goods, asymmetric information, and moral hazard.109 Without an externality or informational asymmetry to improve upon, any regulation is going to
be superfluous or, worse, prevent socially beneficial trades.
B. Financial Pollution
The subprime crisis is decidedly more complex than the conventional narrative implies. The problem is not that mortgages defaulted, but that firms’ incentives led to overinvestment in these se102. See Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 205-06. See generally DAVID P.
BARON, BUSINESS AND ITS ENVIRONMENT 323-61 (5th ed. 2006); R.H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
103. Coase, supra note 102, at 16 (“[T]he costs of reaching the same result by altering
and combining rights through the market may be so great that this optimal arrangement
of rights, and the greater value of production which it would bring, may never
be achieved.”).
104. Id.
105. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 209-10 (“Because regulation can be costly, efficiency . . . demands that the costs of regulation do not exceed its benefits.”).
106. Coase, supra note 102, at 27.
107. See DINO FALASCHETTI & MICHAEL ORLANDO, MONEY, FINANCIAL
INTERMEDIATION, AND GOVERNANCE (2008) (discussing economic assumption of rationality). For a defense of rational choice theory against behavioral economic critiques, see Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1551 (1998).
108. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 205-06.
109. BARON, supra note 102, at 332-38.
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curities. Systemic risk arises because market participants price only
the internal costs and benefits of any transaction, resulting in socially inefficient investment strategies. An efficient regulatory response
must address this moral hazard and disincentivize inefficient governance and investment decisions.110
While commentators have identified this externality, they have
failed to apply this insight to their regulatory proposals.111 All of the
hallmarks of systemic collapse—excessive risk, high leverage, and
subsequent panic112—stem from the failure of firms to internalize the
systemic costs of their actions. Addressing the symptoms of this externality with liquidity provisions, capital requirements, or leverage
constraints will not align the incentives of firms with the socially
beneficial outcome. The primary contribution of this Comment is to
show a mechanism whereby regulators can reduce the incentives
that lead to systemic risk instead of legislating around the problem.
Individually maximizing incentives will lead firms to take incrementally higher risk to outperform competitors. This results in a race
to the risk-management bottom, as firms increase risk exposure and
leverage to outperform their peers.113 However, “[t]he greater flow of
funds into the riskier asset classes . . . further contributes to the
compression of yield spreads, inducing migration yet further down
the risk spectrum.”114 As firms attempt to increase returns, they are

110. See Part 2: Current Trends in Economic Research on Systemic Risk, FRBNY
ECON. POL’Y REV. 17, 20 (2007).
111. Previous proposals focus on particular symptoms of this externality. See, e.g.,
BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 69 (creating minimum capital requirements); PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP, supra note 52, at 31-32 (recommending increased disclosure and capital requirements); Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2 (recommending liquidity provider of last resort).
112. See Rajan, supra note 18, at 501-02, 517-18 (describing how periods of low interest
rates lead firms to increase leverage and risk, which can lead to the realization of tail risk);
Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 214-15 (describing how panic can initiate systemic crisis); Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, Liquidity and Leverage, 10-12, 31-32
(Sept. 2007), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/economists/adrian/
LiquidityLeverage25Sep2007.pdf (describing how economic booms lead firms to increase
leverage and risk, which must be corrected by liquidating assets during a downturn).
113. Rajan, supra note 18, at 501; Brown et al., supra note 58, at 14-15.
114. Plantin et al., Liquidity, and Financial Stability, supra note 78, at 134; see also
Shin, Risk and Liquidity, supra note 67, at 32 (discussing how, as mark to market prices
increase equity, bank managers have incentives to increase leverage). This is apparently
what preceded the failure of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM). After the success of
LTCM’s convergence strategies, “players with similar trading strategies crowded into the
market, the spreads narrowed on the favored convergence trades, eroding the profit margin for all the players.” See Jon Danielsson & Hyun Song Shin, Endogenous Risk 14 (Sept.
21, 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://hyunsongshin.org/www/risk1.pdf.
This forced LTCM into riskier markets to increase returns. When the market reversed, the
fund collapsed. Id. at 14-15. See generally PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP, supra note 52;
Thomsen et al., supra note 18, at 545-47.
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forced to invest in increasingly riskier assets. Problematically, it is
less profitable to engage in socially optimal investment strategies.115
As investment strategies force firms into higher risk and less liquid markets, firms will sell “at a much higher price” out of “apprehens[ion] about the effect of other traders bailing out.”116 Inefficient
investment strategies create socially inefficient selling strategies: as
risk appetite increases on the upside of the market, loss aversion increases on the downside, increasing the market susceptibility to panic.117 The externalities are the same: an efficient regulatory response
need not require firms to irrationally hold falling assets; by realigning incentives on the buy side, the incentive to panic will be efficiently regulated on the downside as well.
1. A Model of Systemic Risk
Procyclical trends increase systemic risk. That is, systemic susceptibility increases on the upside of the financial cycle. For example,
the subprime crisis, the tech bubble, the 1987 stock market crash,
and the Great Depression all followed periods of strong growth.118 Interest rates tend to fall during periods of strong economic growth. As
interest rates fall, competitive pressures forcing managers to increase risk are compounded because low risk investments will not
provide sufficient returns.119 Firms must seek out exceedingly risky
positions to meet minimum returns; managers face similar pressures
to ensure that they do not underperform their peers.120 As interest
115. Part 2: Current Trends in Economic Research on Systemic Risk, supra note 110, at
20 (“If it is costly to hold liquid assets in order to be a buyer and to provide liquidity in a
market crash, why would anyone choose to do it?”).
116. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, Liquidity Black Holes 19-20 (Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Discussion Paper No. 1434, 2003), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=446600; see also Plantin et al., Panacea or Pandora’s Box?,
supra note 47, at 439-40 (“As the liquidity of the asset dries up, marking-to-market becomes significantly more inefficient than the historical cost regime because strategic concerns overwhelm fundamental analysis.”).
117. Shin, Risk and Liquidity, supra note 67, at 5 (describing how external effects are
transferred “on the way up” and “on the way down”); see also Adrian & Shin, supra note
112, at 32 (describing how incentives to increase leverage during economic booms sow the
“seeds of the subsequent downturn”).
118. Eugene N. White, Bubbles and Busts: The 1990s in the Mirror of the 1920s, at 5, 7
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12138, 2006), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12138.pdf; see also Rajan, supra note 18, at 501-02 (“An environment of low interest rates following a period of high rates is particularly problematic,
for not only does the incentive of some participants to ‘search for yield’ go up, but also asset
prices are given the initial impetus, which can lead to an upward spiral, creating the conditions for a sharp and messy realignment.”).
119. Rajan, supra note 18, at 518 (“When risk free returns are high, compensation is
high even if the fund takes on little risk, while when risk free returns are low the fund may
not even exceed the minimum return if it takes little risk.”); see also Plantin et al., Liquidity, and Financial Stability, supra note 78, at 134 (discussing how low interest rates and
compressed yield spreads force firms to take on risky investment strategies).
120. Rajan, supra note 18, at 514-19; see also Kambhu at al., supra note 3, at 10-11, 13.
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rates fall, investors become increasingly confident in market stability
and feel more confident taking on more tail risk.121 However, these
assets produce precisely the type of risk that typifies a liquidity crisis: rare but devastating losses that cause traders to bail out of positions at higher loss levels than is socially optimal.
Further, a firm’s mark-to-market balance sheets expand during
periods of strong growth. Firms must then increase borrowing to
maintain minimum leverage ratios.122 As with risk appetite, “leverage is pro-cyclical.”123 Adrian and Shin hypothesize that, as balance
sheets expand and borrowing increases, firms “increas[e] trading positions through the chasing of yield.”124 This increased leverage is “intimately tied to the short-term incentives facing the [firms’] management.”125 Increasing leverage and chasing yield are two aspects of
the same returns-driven race to the bottom.
Importantly, this is precisely the set of preconditions for a systemic event outlined above. If there is a market event, the systemic
threat is highest at this point. Further, negative mark-to-marketprice shocks will result in instantaneously higher leverage. As with
Carlyle Capital, counterparties demand more collateral, but the firm
will be unable to borrow to meet margin calls as its leverage is
maxed out. If, because of liquidity concerns, the firm is unable to sell
its assets for a fair price, it will default, resulting in liquidation by
its counterparties.
Command and control regulations, such as the Basel Accords, actually increase financial instability during a market shock.126 Under
Basel II’s Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach, firms must maintain minimum capital requirements with respect to individual risk
exposures.127 The capitalization requirements are determined by a
121. Rajan, supra note 18, at 518 (finding “[s]imple proxies such as the VIX index for
the risk aversion of financial markets in the USA do seem to be positively correlated with
the level of short-term interest rates”). The VIX is the “weighted average of the implied volatility in the S&P500 index options.” See Adrian & Shin, supra note 112, at 27. Colloquially, the VIX measures how much traders expect the market to fluctuate and, consequently,
how confident they are in risky positions. Id.
122. See Adrian & Shin, supra note 112, at 8-9; Greenlaw et al., supra note 17, at 2532; Shin, Risk and Liquidity, supra note 67.
123. Adrian & Shin, supra note 112, at 8; Greenlaw et al., supra note 17, at 26, 29-30.
124. Adrian & Shin, supra note 112, at 30.
125. Shin, Risk & Liquidity, supra note 67, at 32.
126. See Benink et al., supra note 78; Plantin et al., Liquidity, and Financial Stability,
supra note 78, at 149; Cifuentes et al., supra note 82, at 32.
127. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 69, at 52-119; see also 17
C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1e (2008); Risk-Based Capital Standards: Advanced Capital Adequacy
Framework — Basel II, 72 Fed. Reg. 69,288 (Dec. 7, 2007) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 3; 12
C.F.R. pt. 208, 225, 12 C.F.R. pt. 325; 12 C.F.R. pt. 559, 560, 563, 567). The Basel Committee permits banks to adopt either the advanced IRB approach or a standardized approach,
which is similar to the original Basel requirements. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, supra note 69, at 19. However, the United States is requiring its large or in-
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firm’s credit risk, operational risk, and market risk.128 Capitalization
levels are dependent on not only the probability of default and loss
given default of each holding, but also on the form that each holding
takes: for example, there are different functions for determining the
minimum capital required for corporate debt, derivatives, and real
estate exposures.129 Basel also requires firms to account for their offbalance sheet holdings.130 The Basel calculations are complex, and
some have called them incomprehensible.131 However, the problem is
not their complexity, but their failure to address the underlying
moral hazard.
While Basel may appear to limit risk taking ex ante, it produces
perverse incentives in the event of an asset shock. Once the price of
an asset is reduced, firms have the incentive to move it off of their
balance sheets to maintain minimum capital levels; as firms sell
more assets, however, the market price is depressed, creating a negative feedback loop “that far outweighs the initial shock.”132 Basel’s
micromanaged approach legislates around the problem without addressing misaligned incentives. Firm-specific capital requirements do
not find the least cost mitigator; Basel simply requires firms to manipulate balance sheets to maintain adequate collateralization. The effect is that, while firms must maintain capitalization, every firm still
has the incentive to maximize returns by entering into increasingly
risky transactions. The systemic externality is simply not addressed.
An efficient regulation must address the fact that socially efficient
investment strategies are not individually maximizing. Firms’ incentives must be aligned with society’s, or else regulation is necessarily
going to legislate around the issue.

ternationally active banks to comply with the IRB approach. Risk-Based Capital Standards: Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework — Basel II, 72 Fed. Reg. at 69,289-90.
128. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 69.
129. Id. at 52, 63-86.
130. Id.; see, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1g(a)(3) (2008) (“The ultimate holding company
shall compute an allowance for credit risk for certain assets on the consolidated balance
sheet and certain off-balance sheet items, including loans and loan commitments, exposures due to derivatives contracts, structured financial products, and other extensions of
credit, and credit substitutes . . . .”).
131. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 224 (quoting Susan Schmidt Bies, Governor, Bd. of Governors, U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys., Basel II Developments in the United
States, Remarks Before the Institute of International Bankers (Sept. 26, 2005)).
132. Plantin et al., Liquidity, and Financial Stability, supra note 78, at 151; see also
Morris & Shin, supra note 116, at 2-3 (“[S]elling pressure[s] sets of further downward
pressure on asset prices, which induces a further round of selling, and so on.”); Plantin et
al., Panacea or Pandora’s Box?, supra note 47, at 439 (“[M]arking-to-market tends to amplify the movements in asset prices relative to their fundamental values in bad states of the
world.”); Shin, Risk and Liquidity, supra note 67, at 23 (describing how solvency constraints can induce endogenous liquidity crises).
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2. The Insufficiency of a Liquidity Provider
Many scholars have recommended creating a formal liquidity provider (lender) of last resort.133 A private or government-sponsored
entity that provides liquidity during a crisis may avoid liquidity spillover by allowing firms to unwind troubled positions, avoiding systemic failure.134 However, a liquidity provider is necessarily an ex
post remedy and does not address the underlying externality.
While Professor Schwarcz recognizes that a liquidity provider may
foster a sense of safety that encourages risk taking, he argues that
refusing to spell out in advance whether the liquidity provider will
assist in any given downturn will create enough constructive ambiguity135 to minimize moral hazard. Assuming arguendo that he is correct, this approach will necessarily not reduce systemic risk, but will
merely avoid systemic failure. A liquidity provider alone is, therefore,
not an optimal regulatory response.
Further, though a liquidity provider of last resort serves socially
beneficial ends, the Federal Reserve is acting in that capacity already. The Federal Reserve recently created a short term lending facility for AAA securities as collateral to provide liquidity to troubled
firms.136 Further, in fear of institutional failure, the Federal Reserve
guaranteed Bear Stearns’ liabilities in conjunction with J.P. Morgan’s private sector acquisition.137 Though the Federal Reserve’s authority to enter into these transactions is unclear,138 such jurisdic133. See Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 225-30, 241-49.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 226; see also Partnoy, supra note 53, at 785.
136. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Mar. 11, 2008),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20080311a.htm [hereinafter Board of
Governors Press Release].
137. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Mar. 14, 2008),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20080314a.htm; see also Neil
Irwin & David Cho, Fed Takes Broad Action to Avert Financial Crisis: Central Bank Backs
Sale of Bear Sterns, Cuts Key Interest Rate, Extends New Credit, WASH. POST, Mar. 17,
2008, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/
16/AR2008031601672.html.
138. The Federal Reserve may open its discount window and lend to any firm in “unusual and exigent circumstances” and has been traditionally thought of as a lender of last
resort. 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006); Actions by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in Response to Liquidity Pressures in Financial Markets: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 12-13, 16 (2008) [hereinafter Actions by the Federal
Reserve
Hearings],
available
at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/
OpgStmtGeithner4308Testimony.pdf (statement of Timothy F. Geithner, Pres. & CEO,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York) (noting that Federal Reserve is a lender of last resort
but that exercising such authority is an “extraordinary step”). However, it is unclear how
far this authority actually extends. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 230 & n.232
(noting that the Federal Reserve’s ability to act as a lender of last resort “is ambiguous under existing law” and that it likely lacks the authority to purchase securities outright). For
instance, the Federal Reserve is restricted in its ability to acquire equity interests in firms,
but it may freely purchase Treasury Bills. Actions by the Federal Reserve Hearings, supra,
at 13 (statement of Timothy F. Geithner, Pres. & CEO, Federal Reserve Bank of New
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tional doubt is likely the highest form of constructive ambiguity. Additionally, when profitable, the private sector has bailed out troubled
firms. Citadel Investment Group bailed Amaranth and Sowood, two
troubled hedge funds, when collapse was imminent.139 Similarly, as
the credit crisis unfolded, the Carlyle Group quickly formed a fund to
“do everything from investing in publicly traded bonds and bank
loans to purchasing ailing companies outright.”140
Finally, a responsible liquidity provider can lend only against assets which are truly illiquid and not actually worthless. For instance,
the Federal Reserve loaned not against subprime MBS, but only
against assets which were practically guaranteed.141 No one has come
forward to lend against assets which may be truly impaired, such as
subordinated tranches or second-lien securities.142 A liquidity provider will be unable to lend against assets which are complex enough to
make determining the worth cost prohibitive.
3. Increased Disclosure Would Be Ineffective
Systemic risk is a result of incentives which induce excessive risk
taking, even in the presence of full disclosure; therefore, despite its
prevalence in other financial regulation, additional disclosure will be
ineffective.143 The problem is not that firms do not realize the risks
they are undertaking, but that maximizing investment strategies requires them to take those risks.144 Firms have no incentive to reduce
York) (“We did not have the authority to acquire an equity interest in either Bear or
JPMorgan Chase . . . .”); Jon Hilsenrath & Liz Rappaport, Fed Weighs Idea of Buying Treasuries as Focus Shifts, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2009, at A4 (noting that the Federal Reserve
“has clear legal authority to buy government debt”). However, regulators appear free to
liberally construe the power granted by section 343. The Federal Reserve’s loan to AIG is
technically a secured loan, but it is often characterized as an equity purchase. See Matthew
Karnitschnig et al., U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central Banks Inject
Cash as Credit Dries up, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2008, at A1 (noting that the AIG
transaction is a secured loan but that it effectively transfers a majority interest to
the government).
139. Systemic Risk Hearings, supra note 7, at 51 (statement of Richard Bookstaber);
Jenny Anderson, Hedge Fund Forced to Sell Its Portfolio, N.Y. TIMES ONLINE, July 31,
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/31/business/31hedge.html?_r=1&oref=slogin.
140. Peter Lattman, Carlyle Fund to Target Distressed Assets; New Vehicle Enters a
Crowded Field; Much Less Leverage, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 2008, at C3, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120753238767993945.html.
141. See Board of Governors Press Release, supra note 136.
142. As late as February 2009, it was impossible to properly value securitized mortgage assets because the market had been almost completely frozen for over six months. See
Robert C. Pozen, Op-Ed., How to Value Toxic Bank Assets, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2009, at
A13, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120753238767993945.html.
143. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 218 (“[I]ndividual market participants
who fully understand that risk will be motivated to protect themselves but not the system
as a whole.”); see also Brown et al., supra note 58, at 15 (“Indeed, even if markets enjoy
complete information about a firm’s governance decisions, they will only price the internal
costs and benefits of those decisions.”).
144. See Rajan, supra note 18, at 514-19.
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returns to make the financial system marginally more stable for other firms engaging in risky investment strategies.
Further, firms are provided the balance sheets of their counterparties. The problem is not that firms are unaware of systemic risk,
but that it is individually less profitable to factor the cost to the system into a firm’s decisionmaking calculus. Accordingly, increased
disclosure should not be expected to result in firm-level changes that
would diminish systemic risk.145
4. Internalizing Costs to the System
An optimal solution to systemic risk must reduce the impediments
to firms engaging in mutually and socially beneficial risk management. This is precisely the same externality produced by environmental pollutants. Each firm imposes costs on the environment because it prices only the costs and benefits of production internally,
resulting in socially detrimental pollution levels.146 Absent transaction costs, firms could bargain with each other to produce the efficient levels of pollution. However, “[t]he costs would be exorbitant if
all these individuals attempted to reach an agreement,”147 and the
cost of pollution controls would reduce the firm’s profitability. The
result is that without regulation, a socially detrimental amount of
pollution is produced.
From a regulatory perspective, excess systemic risk and excess
pollution are the same problem. The solution lies in forcing firms to
internalize the effects of their decisions, reducing the harm to the socially optimal level. Tradable permit systems have proven effective at
reducing pollution to socially beneficial levels, forcing firms to internalize the cost of their emissions.148 Such a system may provide an efficient way to limit systemic risk while allowing private ordering to
efficiently allocate risk to the firms best able to manage it.149 Though
this proposal will face significant obstacles in implementation, the
underlying incentive structure is efficient.
A tradable permit system150 sets the total market allowance of the
regulated good to a socially efficient level; however, because the permits can be traded, firms can allocate use to the most productive
145. Disclosure in other ways (i.e., more information) may lead to new avenues of regulation, but disclosure itself will not serve as effective regulation.
146. BARON, supra note 102, at 363-92 (“[S]ocial efficiency requires that the polluter
and those affected by the pollution externality take into account both the harm and the
costs of abatement.”).
147. Id. at 367.
148. See generally KARAN CAPOOR & PHILIPPE AMBROSI, THE WORLD BANK, STATE AND
TRENDS OF THE CARBON MARKET (2007) [hereinafter CARBON MARKET] (providing general
discussion of carbon trading markets).
149. BARON, supra note 102, at 367-68.
150. “Tradable permit” and “cap and trade” are synonymous.
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user.151 This type of system is optimal because activity is limited to
the efficient level, but firms are able to trade allowances to meet
“compliance requirements at the lowest possible cost.”152 Social efficiency results because firms can bargain over the ability to engage in
the regulated activity over the efficient level. Effectively, firms are
forced to internalize the cost of the harm because the individually
maximizing strategy prices the cost of permitting to continue engaging in the activity. The firm best able to abate will reduce its activity
and sell its unused permits for any price higher than the profit it
would gain from incrementally increasing its usage of the regulated
good. As a corollary, a firm that cannot abate for the least cost will
purchase permits for any price below the profit it would lose from
abating the activity.
The socially efficient outcome will result whether the permits are
allocated for no charge or auctioned to the highest bidder at the outset.153 For example, if a firm is allocated permits, it can abate the activity and sell to a nonabating competitor for any price between its
cost of abatement and its competitor; if the permits are auctioned initially, the nonabating firm will purchase for any price below the cost
of abating. Initial allocation does affect the distribution of wealth,
but, in either scenario, both firms price the cost to the system, and
the regulated activity is abated by the firm that can do so at the
least cost.154
By limiting the total pollution allowed each year, firms have the
incentive to efficiently reduce the emissions and profit of their margin of abatement efficiency by selling permits to other firms. In effect, a tradable permit system realigns firms’ profit maximizing incentives with the socially efficient level of pollution. Because each
firm can make an arbitrage profit by reducing its cost of abatement,
firms have prosocial incentives. For example, allowances under the
Clean Air Act reduced sulfur dioxide emissions from coal plants by
forty-five percent and at half the cost of comparable command-andcontrol regulation.155 The EPA implemented a similar system, which
reduced nitrogen oxide emissions by over sixty percent from
peak levels.156

151. BARON, supra note 102, at 367-68 (discussing tradable permit mechanisms for pollutants); CARBON MARKET, supra note 148, at 11 (discussing allowance-based tradable
permit markets).
152. BARON, supra note 102, at 367-68.
153. Id. at 367 (“With any of these allocations, social efficiency can be achieved provided the permits can be traded”). See generally Coase, supra note 102.
154. See BARON, supra note 102, at 367-68.
155. Id.; see also Sulfur Dioxide Allowance System, 40 C.F.R. § 73 (2008).
156. BARON, supra note 102, at 367-68; see also Acid Rain Nitrogen Oxides Emission
Reduction Program, 40 C.F.R. § 76 (2008).
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Though the incentives are similar, systemic risk does not perfectly
map onto environmental regulation. The most problematic aspect is
the dimension of regulation. For pollution, a regulator can easily determine what is to be regulated; for systemic risk, the activity that
must be abated is less clear. In some aspects, however, systemic risk
regulation is less difficult to implement. Implementing financial regulation is not saddled with the costs of construction or installation
that may hamper pollution controls. Further, financial regulation
should be easier to monitor. Once the relevant dimension is determined, monitoring could easily be automated provided that firms disclose accurate information. Finally, because financial regulation is
virtual, the efficient level of risk can be modified without cost, similar to interest rates, if initial estimates are incorrect or innovation
shifts the efficient level of risk.
The primary impediment to implementing such a system is quantifying the efficient level of risk. While resolving this issue is far
beyond the scope of this Comment, the computations are clearly not
impossible. Both Basel I and II presume that regulators can determine efficient levels of risk for large financial firms. If we accept that
Basel can quantify risk to acceptable degrees of error, we need only
modify the way that capitalization ratios are allocated in order to
create tradable risk credits.
By reframing the problem, regulators can sensibly ask who can
mitigate systemic risk for the least cost. By identifying the problem,
we can ask which party in the externality can reduce risk at the lowest cost to society. In a frictionless market, we would expect to see
market participants bargaining to reduce risk. However, the transaction costs of such a bargain are clearly prohibitive. Systemic risk
must be addressed at the firm level by forcing market participants to
bear the cost of their investment strategies.
5. A New Capital Adequacy
The correct dimension to regulate must be one that accurately internalizes the systemic cost of any decision. However, systemic risk is
produced along a number of dimensions, such as leverage, liquidity,
and size. Regulating any one of these dimensions would be insufficient to limit systemic risk. A large, leveraged firm pursuing low risk
investments will present little systemic risk. Similarly, a large firm
with low leverage will not threaten the system no matter how risky
its positions are. Finally, firms with sufficiently small holdings will
not present systemic risks no matter how risky or leveraged they are.
However, modifying Basel II’s advanced capital adequacy framework will adequately capture all of the relevant dimensions. Instead
of using the Basel II requirements to set firm-specific leverage and
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capital levels, regulators could use the Basel formulas to determine
firm-specific indices which could be bought and sold in increments.
As noted above, the existence of the Basel Accords presumes that the
calculations are not impossible or excessively arbitrary. By setting
the total systemic risk at the socially efficient level, firms could bargain to increase their individual index, either through total size, leverage, or risk exposure. Basel II requirements are cognizant of the
size of the firm and minimum capitalization requirements and also
control for leverage.157 Further, the IRB approach requires firms to
impose liquidity haircuts on illiquid assets.158 Basel II measures the
right dimensions; it simply does not implement them in a way that
changes firms’ inefficient incentives. Fundamentally, Basel ignores
the externality underlying systemic events: it does not force firms to
internalize the systemic costs of their decisions. The result is that
each firm still has the incentive to take as much risk as its capital
constraints will allow.
If we accept that the IRB index can serve as a rough proxy for systemic risk, we need only allow firms to bargain for the right to exceed
individual risk levels. The Federal Reserve can determine, based on
the combined size of the largest institutions’ balance sheets, a capitalization rate sufficient to ensure financial stability for the entire
market. Firms can then trade credits to determine how that capitalization is allocated.159 Exactly how this index would be determined is
outside the scope of this Comment; the basic dimensions, however,
are already present under the Basel framework. Firms that are best
able to reduce risk will be able to do so and profit from selling their
unused risk. The socially efficient strategy and the individually maximizing strategies will be aligned.
If the Basel formulas can be adopted so that the level of capitalization reflects the total balance sheets of all regulated firms, firms
may then trade the right to engage in investment strategies that
would exceed their capital constraints. Firms can increase returns by
either buying risk credits or reducing illiquid positions, allowing leverage to fall against increasing balance sheets and selling credits.
Here, the risk-preferring firm can continue high-risk investment
strategies, but in doing so, it must price the costs to the system. The

157. Implementing Basel, supra note 69 (discussing how U.S. implementation of Basel
II retains the leverage ratio found in Basel I).
158. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 69, at 31-36 (providing formula for determining liquidity discounts); see, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1e(b)(3) (2008) (requiring liquidity to be taken into account when evaluating the market risk for any
particular holding).
159. For instance, the E.P.A establishes accounts for all regulated firms to “account
and allocate” allowance credits. See 40 C.F.R. § 73.31. These accounts are then used to
transfer credits between firms. See 40 C.F.R. §73.50.
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increased cost of pursuing high-yield investments will provide a disincentive to pursuing inefficient trading strategies.
Risk-averse firms have the incentive to pursue less risky strategies but remain competitive by selling unused risk credits. These
firms will become less leveraged and less exposed to high-risk markets, reducing the total systemic risk. As there are fewer firms pursuing the same high-risk investment, spreads will not narrow as
quickly. Firms will have less incentive to travel down the risk continuum, and the total risk exposure should decline, even without the
internalization provided by limiting borrowing.
The result will be a bifurcation of the market into risk-taking
firms and risk-avoiding firms. Risk-taking firms can still pursue
high-yield investments, but in the event of a market shock, riskavoiding firms will have liquid balance sheets and the ability to engage in for-profit bailouts. By realigning incentives, the market can
effectively regulate itself during liquidity panics.
The implementation of a cap and trade will raise some difficulties.
First, the proper scope of the regulations must be determined. Should
all institutions be covered or only those with balance sheets above a
certain threshold? Similarly, should hedge funds be regulated or only
publicly traded funds? Though hedge funds have been criticized,160
they do not generally pose significant systemic threats. While hedge
funds do not publicly disclose their trading strategies, counterparties
are given disclosures that are detailed enough to inform their lending
decisions.161 Long Term Capital Management’s162 failure was not devastating because of its “status as a hedge fund but [because of] the
sheer size of its exposure to other institutions.”163 A prudent regulation would likewise exempt all funds below a certain size, regardless
of their legal structure.164

160. See Jenny Strasburg, Legislators Seek Hedge-Fund Disclosure, WALL ST. J., Feb.
2, 2009, at C2, available at http://sec.online.wsj.com/article/SB123353873110737937.html
(noting several senators have proposed legislation mandating hedge fund registration to
“to help prevent market catastrophes and investor fraud”); see also Hedge Fund
Transparency Act, S. 344, 111th Cong. (2009); 155 CONG. REC. S1059 (daily ed. Jan. 29,
2009) (statement of Sen. Levin).
161. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 218 (“[C]ounterparties already demand,
and usually receive, disclosure to the extent it helps them assess the merits of their investments, qua investments.”).
162. See supra note 114 for a brief discussion of LCTM’s failure.
163. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 203.
164. See generally Tamar Frankel, Private Investment Funds: Hedge Funds’ Regulation
by Size, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 657 (2008) (arguing the size of hedge funds should be regulated
by restricting the ability of banks and financial intermediaries to contribute capital to private investment firms).
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Further, it is important to note that the ideal level of systemic
risk is not zero.165 The ideal level of systemic risk is the level at which
additional reduction of risk would not offset the possible lost financial gains. While quantifying systemic risk will be empirically and
mathematically difficult, regulators are not beginning from a blank
slate. The Basel Accords are premised on the ability to quantify the
ideal rate of capitalization to ensure financial stability. Further, several academics have attempted to model or quantify systemic risk.166
If we can sensibly talk about quantifying the risk of terrorist attack,167 producing a workable estimate of systemic risk is well within
our capabilities. Insurance companies routinely quantify the risk of
rare events, such as hurricanes, floods, or the chance someone will
hit a hole-in-one during a golf tournament. While exactly determining an ideal level of risk is unlikely, producing a liberal estimate is
possible. As regulators evaluate the effectiveness of the proposal, the
allowed level of risk can be revised with little cost.
Finally, an enacted system would have to determine how to allocate these credits. Traditionally, tradable permits can either be purchased from the government or allocated for no cost and then traded
among firms. While either method is efficient, allocating the credits
at no cost to firms will likely increase support for this proposal from
the financial sector.
This Comment’s main contribution offers a different way to frame
the systemic risk problem and a novel way to resolve the issue. Determining the efficient level of systemic exposure will be difficult but
not insurmountable. Certainly, a regulator can create exemptions for
startup firms, firms with balance sheets below a certain level, or notfor-profit companies. By encouraging firms to internalize the systemic consequences of their actions, the level of systemic risk can be reduced ex ante, improving the stability of the financial system.

165. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Address at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s 2006 Financial Markets Conference: Hedge
Funds and Systemic Risk (May 16, 2006), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/bernanke20060516a.htm (stating that the cost of eliminating systemic risk would
stifle productivity); see also Schwarz, supra note 2, at 23-24 (“Because regulation can be
costly, efficiency also demands that the costs of regulation do not exceed its benefits.”).
166. See Sanjiv Ranjan Das & Raman Uppal, Systemic Risk and International Portfolio
Choice, 59 J. FIN. 2809, 2817-31 (2004) (attempting to model systemic risk and determine
optimal portfolio choice); Craig H. Furfine, Interbank Exposures: Quantifying the Risk of
Contagion, 35 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 111, 120-25 (2003) (quantifying risk of contagious bank failures using interbank loan data). See generally Richard A. Posner, Efficient
Reponses to Catastrophic Risk, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 511 (2006) (discussing pricing of
catastrophe events).
167. See generally HENRY H. WILLIS ET AL., RAND CORP., ESTIMATING TERRORISM RISK
(2005), available at http://rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG388.pdf.
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V. CONCLUSION
As shown by this Comment, the subprime mortgage crisis is the
result of an unprecedented regime shift in subprime performance
combined with inefficient incentives in the financial system. While
increased defaults are troubling, they are not the result of any real
market failure. The market appears to have corrected its pricing errors, and there is no reason to believe that market discipline
is insufficient.
Systemic risk, however, must be addressed by regulators. As the
subprime crisis has illustrated, systemic failures are more than an
academic concern. Traditional approaches to financial regulation appear inadequate; the problem is not that particular financial instruments or debt levels are inherently too risky, but that competitive incentives in the market lead to inefficient outcomes. Innovation is necessary and should be encouraged, but regulators must align the
firms’ private maximizing incentives with efficient social outcomes.
Otherwise, regulators risk proscribing beneficial financial innovations or falling a step behind the next systemic threat.
This Comment has proposed a new framework with which to analyze the problem that may prove helpful in stabilizing the financial
system. While further research is necessary, a tradable permit system appears to realign incentives for firm managers. A robust market in tradable-risk credits could create a system where firms’ maximizing incentives are efficient, instead of producing a tragedy of the
commons that overexploits limited financial resources.

